Public-private partnership: a framework for private sector involvement in public infrastructure projects by Cruz, Carlos Oliveira & da Cruz, Nuno F.
  
Carlos Oliveira Cruz and Nuno F. da Cruz 
Public-private partnership: a framework for 
private sector involvement in public 
infrastructure projects 
 
Book section 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Originally published in Wegrich, Kai, Kostka, Genia and Hammerschmid, Gerhard, (eds.) The 
Governance of Infrastructure. Hertie Governance Report. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 
pp. 103-126. ISBN 9780198787310 
 
© 2017 Hertie School of Governance 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/71140/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
Comp. by: C. Vijayakumar Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002855194 Date:23/9/16
Time:14:22:56 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002855194.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 103
6
Public–Private Partnership
A Framework for Private Sector Involvement
in Public Infrastructure Projects
Carlos Oliveira Cruz and Nuno F. da Cruz
Introduction
The delivery of public infrastructure has long been a key concern of political
leaders, given its impact on economic competitiveness, quality of life, and
social and economic cohesion, as well as its role as the backbone of local,
regional, and national economic fabrics. Although investment in infrastruc-
ture has declined in recent years as a consequence of the economic crisis and
its impact on governments’ abilities to maintain public expenditure levels,
there will be a massive need for investment in infrastructure over the next
couple of decades. Governments around the world will need to raise over US
$57 trillion by 2030, according to McKinsey Global Institute (Dobbs et al.
2013). The World Bank (Rodriguez, van den Berg, and McMahon 2012) esti-
mates a staggering US$22 trillion is needed in developing countries. For water
and sanitation projects alone, estimated needs in the short term amount to US
$103 billion per year (Yepes 2008).
Although infrastructure investment is currently a priority for emerging
economies (Zhang 2014), there remains a lack of investment in the mainten-
ance of existing infrastructure in advanced economies such as Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States of America and especially in sectors
such as transport or energy distribution (Hull 2008). The need for investment
in infrastructure maintenance is already on the agenda of many advanced
economies. The US$300 billion bill for transport infrastructure development,
introduced in 2014 by US President Barack Obama, and the Investment Plan
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for Europe, announced by European Commission President Juncker in
November 2014, are good indicators of this concern.
Therefore, regarding infrastructure development, the question to be
answered is not whether to invest but rather how. Some basic considerations
are in order. First, governments alone are not capable of leveraging such
investment levels, and thus private ﬁnancing is often a requirement. Further,
public management of utilities and market-based sectors such as energy,
telecommunications, and water supply has for years now been accused of
inefﬁciency and lack of capacity to innovate.1 Finally, the cost of private
ﬁnancing is higher than direct state funding through bonds or similar mech-
anisms (Boubakri and Cosset 1998; Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh
1994), and past experiences of full privatisation have also fallen short of
expectations, leading to undesirable outcomes.2 How then can public author-
ities ensure that value for money will be achieved?
Models for delivering and managing infrastructure have been changing
alongside the trend of increased private sector involvement in traditional
public administration affairs and sectors (Dunleavy 1986; Miranda and
Lerner 1995). The privatisation and/or deregulation wave in many public
services, especially transport, has changed the way infrastructure is managed,
although private sector participation has not always delivered beneﬁts as
expected. For every case of failed privatisation, there are arguments invoked
to justify the poor performance of the private sector. Usually these arguments
revolve around macroeconomic changes, for example currency devaluation,
or overestimated demand or government interference, such as changing the
scope of the contracted projects or services, unilateral changes to tariffs, or
new regulations.
Given the extreme polarisation of the two classic delivery models—public
ownership versus full privatisation—and their associated beneﬁts and pitfalls,
public–private partnership (PPP) arrangements emerged as an intermediate
model intended to provide the best of both worlds by assigning the private
sector with more direct control over operations and allowing the public sector
to focus on its core roles and regulatory functions. Public decision-makers and
authorities have complex objective functions often involving concerns with
public opinion, general welfare, respect for minorities, and other political and
electoral matters (Jones 1994) that are difﬁcult to harmonise with the
1 Whether these accusations have been fair, let alone true, is still a contentious issue and one
that is beyond the scope of this chapter. For some of the arguments on the superiority of private
management of economically productive public assets, see Yarrow et al. (1986), Vickers and Yarrow
(1991), Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), Megginson and
Netter (2001), or D’Souza and Megginson (1999).
2 A classic example is the privatisation of British Rail and subsequent bankruptcy of the new
owner, Railtrack (see more in Gibb, Lowndes, and Charlton 1996 or Crompton and Jupe 2003).
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commercial management of a utility or public infrastructure asset. Although
theoretically capable of capturing the beneﬁts of private management while
retaining a strong level of control by public authorities, experience has
revealed relevant liabilities linked to the use of the PPP model, particularly
when dealing with large capital investments and/or signiﬁcant revenue risk, as
discussed below. Regardless, the use of PPPs has experienced a remarkable
expansion over recent decades around the world (see Burger and Hawkesworth
2013) and across different levels of public administration.
PPPs have been pitched as a way to increase the efﬁciency3 of infrastructure
services while providing access to private capital in the context of growing
shortages of public funding. Whereas the former should constitute the rea-
sonable rationale for engaging in PPPs, empirical evidence suggests that the
latter has been the primary driver for the surge of these arrangements. Until
2011, European Commission rules for the estimation of public deﬁcits allowed
governments to leverage the ﬁnancing of national and local infrastructure
development plans via PPPs by isolating their impacts on public budgets
(Spackman 2002; EPEC 2010). The expenditure and debt associated with
PPPs were considered ‘off balance sheet’, in other words not included in public
deﬁcit and debt calculation, thus bypassing budgetary constraints. This tech-
nicality distorted the rationale and potential beneﬁts of PPPs and raised some
fair criticism about the model: namely, the argument that PPPs were more a
ﬁscal and ﬁnancial engineering trapdoor than a procurementmodel to increase
the productivity and allocative efﬁciency of public spending. Furthermore, the
off balance sheet treatment provided by the existing public accounting rules
allowed for the development of ‘white elephant’ projects with revenue streams
that could barely match operating costs, leaving public authorities unable to
cope with the debt service (Sadka 2006). The ability to deliver infrastructure
now and pay later, sometimes after several mandates, created space for political
opportunism where beneﬁts were generated with lagged costs attached.
The PPP procurementmodel is still experiencing large expansion, particularly
in emerging economies in Africa and Asia. But it is also gaining momentum in
top performers such as in the USA, where state governments in, for example,
Florida, Virginia, and California are producing legislation and promoting public
discussions on where and how to use the model as a leverage tool to allow for
the rehabilitation and upgrading of basic infrastructure, with a focus on the
energy and transport sectors. Much of the expansion in the use of the model is
based on the potential advantages of using PPP arrangements, such as the
3 Efﬁciency can be brieﬂy deﬁned as the ratio of outputs produced to inputs consumed in a
certain activity. Efﬁciency can be increased by reducing inputs for the same level of outputs,
increasing outputs for the same level of inputs, or simultaneously increasing outputs and
decreasing inputs. In the case of public infrastructure projects and in simple terms, time and cost
can be regarded as inputs and quality as the output.
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possibility of having a more dynamic and goal-oriented approach to the man-
agement of public services through specialised international companies with
profound know-how and the ability to implement best practices and the most
innovative solutions. Furthermore, public debt restrictions also play a funda-
mental role in the growing use of PPPs. Over the last decades, it has been
increasingly difﬁcult for governments to leverage their infrastructure develop-
ment plans solely with traditional public ﬁnance. Most infrastructure systems
are capital-intensive and require signiﬁcant capital availability during construc-
tion and/or expansion. Simultaneously, the ﬁnance sector sees infrastructure
investment as amore stable solution, when compared to traditional investment
in stocks and private bonds, providing shareholders and investors with a stead-
ier inﬂow of capital over the long run. The rate of returnmay be lower than the
equivalent investment in, for example, high-tech companies or ﬁnancial insti-
tution stocks, but the uncertainty is also much lower. The combination of these
drivers is the main reason for the acceleration of PPPs at the global scale. Today
the discussion, both academic and professional, is mostly about how to
improve the design, implementation, and management of PPPs rather than
the search for alternatives.
Although the discussion around the emergence of PPPs cannot be disasso-
ciated from the discussion of privatisation (Gómez-Ibáñez 2003), these are
different concepts, even though they are frequently used interchangeably,
with PPP development often referred to as privatisation. It is therefore helpful
to clarify the distinction between the two concepts at the outset. Privatisation
means the material sale of assets ad aeternum or until the public sector buys
back or nationalises the assets. In a privatisation process, the private sector can
buy a company or a portion of shares, and from that moment on, that
company or the shares become the private sector’s asset.
PPP arrangements are different. The PPP universe is extremely wide and
encompasses a variety of business models and contractual structures, each
with distinct institutional strengths and weaknesses. There are several models
of PPP—presented in greater detail in the following sections of this chapter—
that may or may not include the ownership of assets, but even when the
private sector owns an asset, it is for a limited period of time (the duration of
the contract). After the termination of the contract, the assets revert to the
public sector, which can choose whether to re-enter a PPP agreement or to
assume direct management of the asset. Despite this technical but signiﬁcant
distinction, the term ‘privatisation’ is frequently used to refer to the delega-
tion of responsibilities for operation from the public sector to the private
sector in traditionally publicly-owned sectors like transport, environment,
energy, and other services of general interest. In general, both in professional
outlets and in academic research, most of what is referred to as the privatisa-
tion of infrastructure actually refers to PPP implementation and development.
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This chapter presents a discussion on the PPP concept, the different models
and approaches being adopted on the ground, and the economic rationale
for taking the PPP route. Furthermore, on the basis of a comprehensive review
of existing literature and the authors’ own empirical research, it provides an
ex-post evaluation of the performance and outcomes of PPP arrangements in
various infrastructure sectors. The chapter concludes with some guidelines
and prospective recommendations about trends concerning the use of PPPs in
the medium- to long-term and key success factors for policy-makers and
institutional leaders.
Concepts, models, and rationale
Given the prevalence of PPPs in the debate surrounding infrastructure gov-
ernance and the various options for delivering infrastructure, some clarity
regarding concepts, approaches, and rationales is required before more closely
examining performance and outcomes.
Privatisation, project ﬁnance, and PPPs
As hinted at above, the PPP concept is oftenmisguidedly used interchangeably
with the concepts of privatisation and project ﬁnance. Under privatisation,
the process involves selling assets or shares of a company owning certain
assets. In a PPP, the private partner has the right to operate and possibly
own an infrastructure asset but only for a pre-determined duration,4 unlike
privatisation models. ‘Project ﬁnance’ concerns a ﬁnancial technique in
which lenders provide debt based on future cash ﬂows. This is the only real
asset, or guaranty, given that the high speciﬁcity of the sunk investment in an
infrastructure project makes it non-tradable, with little or null book value in
case of project default. Much of the interest of the public and private sectors in
PPP ﬁnancing is related to the project ﬁnance model that allows companies to
leverage their investment capacity without a typical debt consolidation in
their books like in corporate ﬁnance models. What might seem to be an
accounting technicality is actually a large stimulus for private ﬁnanciers.
The project ﬁnance structure of a PPP is highly complex. The structure of
ﬁnancing sources should be expected to change throughout the life cycle of a
4 There are cases where the duration is not ﬁxed—for example, variable duration road
concessions in Chile (Nombela and de Rus 2004)—but is still temporally constrained. In such a
case, the contract will be terminated at some point, and the rule to calculate the moment of
contract termination, for example contingent on total revenue, is clearly established upon
contract signature.
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project given mutations in its risk proﬁle. During construction, banks and
banking syndicates provide most of the ﬁnancing and closely monitor con-
tract execution. Even before construction, banks have an active role in the
drafting and negotiation of a contract. During operation, when construction
risk has dissipated, the proﬁle of lenders can change towards that of bond-
holders, which have less control of and intervention into the project itself and
generally have no interference in contract negotiation or renegotiation
(Yescombe 2007). To move towards a model of bondholders, a project needs
to have a controlled level of risk and an extremely low value at risk in order to
minimise the exposure of the banks to losses.
Models of infrastructure delivery
PPPs are fundamentally a procurement model under which public authorities
develop and acquire infrastructure assets and/or public services. Within the
models of public procurement, there are traditional public works contracts.
Under such an arrangement, governments can, for example, contract con-
struction companies to build an infrastructure asset under particular technical
speciﬁcations deﬁned by the contracting authority—the government, a gov-
ernmental agency, or a publicly owned company—and under applicable legis-
lation. Once construction is ﬁnished, the public sector owner of the
infrastructure asset is responsible for managing the asset and ensuring that
services are delivered to the population adequately. In a PPP arrangement, on
the other hand, the public authority establishes a long-term contract with the
private partner for building or upgrading, managing, and eventually ﬁnancing
the infrastructure.
It is possible to summarise the main organisational forms for delivering
public infrastructure according to three broad categories, each of which can
be subdivided into several subcategories:
• Public in-house delivery/management: This can be performed under
different models, such as government department, semi-autonomous
entity, or public company. The public sector’s relationship with the
private sector is limited to contracting out the inputs necessary to perform
the activity at hand, for example construction works, acquisition of
equipment, and even ancillary tasks via short-term contracts. The public
sector retains managerial and operational responsibility and interacts
directly with citizens/users, suppliers, and regulatory authorities. Fre-
quently, public authorities regard this model as one under which there
is no need for regulation, given that the supplier—the government
itself—intrinsically intends to protect the public interest. Not only is
this not always true, but experience has shown that there should be a
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clear delimitation of the state’s role as an operator, shareholder, regulator,
policy-maker, and legitimate representative of the people.
• Full privatisation or divestiture: This is the case when a transfer of assets
and operational responsibility is unlimited in duration, and the role of the
public sector will be restricted to external regulation. There are some
examples of full privatisation of public services throughout the world,
particularly in the UK, Chile, and the USA. However, in many jurisdic-
tions, for example Thailand, it is a legal requirement to maintain essential
public infrastructure assets under the public domain.5 In the case of full
privatisation or divestiture, relations with users are handled only via the
private company.
• PPP arrangements: Here the array of options is vast, but the rationale is
that a private partner will have the responsibility of managing and
delivering services, in some cases co-managing or co-delivering. This
relationship is limited in duration, usually to the time necessary to depre-
ciate the investment, for example thirty or forty years; ruled by a contract
or series of contracts signed between the partners; and possibly also ruled
by an independent sector-speciﬁc regulator. Relations with citizens/users
depend on the actual model.
Types of PPPs
Within the PPP realm, there are several types of arrangements according to the
various characteristics of the project to be developed (Ng and Loosemore
2007). Authors and ofﬁcial public institutions use distinct classiﬁcations that
are not always compatible, but in general, these classiﬁcations are based on
four criteria:
• Financial characteristics of the project: A PPP is deﬁned as stand-alone
when it does not require governmental subsidies, while a PPP is con-
sidered subsidised when the stream of revenues is not enough to ensure
the economic equilibrium of the project;
• Governance model: A PPP can be of a purely contractual nature or of an
institutional nature, as discussed further below;
• Ownership: The ownership of the assets can remain in the public domain
during the whole life cycle or it can be held temporarily by the private
5 These legal requirements are generally linked to a political motivation of avoiding the control
of infrastructure monopolies by private companies. Governments choose to vertically separate the
system, in other words. separate the ownership of the physical infrastructure from service
operation or management, allowing for private companies to bid for the control of operation.
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partner, although the public partner may be required to pay a residual
value for the transfer by the end of the contract;
• Project life cycle stages included in the agreement: A PPP can include
some or all stages of the infrastructure life cycle, for instance design,
ﬁnancing, construction, maintenance, operation, and/or transfer. The
classiﬁcation of PPPs based on these stages gave origin to a series of
acronyms that are well known within the PPP expert community: build-
own-maintain (BOM), design-build-operate (DBO), design-build-ﬁnance-
operate (DBFO), build-operate-transfer (BOT), and build-rent-own-
transfer (BROT), among others.
These criteria are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is common to ﬁnd
different classiﬁcations for PPP projects based on one or more of these criteria.
One of the most commonly used terms to refer to PPPs is ‘concession’.
However, a concession is merely one of the many possible forms of PPP, and
even this particular form can be used with entirely different business models
and contractual structures. Basically, a concession is when the government
gives a private entity the sole right to exploit a certain service for a certain
period of time (Delmon 2010). In some countries, such as France and Portugal,
the term concession was used when private remuneration was only based on
user fees and the government did not have to pay any compensation to the
private partner, or concessionaire, similar to the ‘administrative concession’
deﬁned in the Brazilian legislation.6 The use of the term has evolved, but the
distinction between projects that have to be ﬁnanced by the public sector and
those that do not require public ﬁnancing is still closely linked to the classi-
ﬁcation of PPP projects. Allen (2001) also uses the presence or absence of
public subsidies to support the classiﬁcation of PPPs and established three
distinct types: 1) freestanding projects, for which there are no public subsidies,
with the project subsisting on user charges; 2) joint ventures, in which there is
a contribution from the public sector, while the concessionaire is responsible
for managing the service; and 3) services sold, which corresponds to the case
of full privatisation.
A common and clear classiﬁcation is the one developed by the European
Commission establishing two types of PPPs according to the legal status and
governance model of the partnership (Yescombe 2007). The ﬁrst type, con-
tractual PPPs, refers to those cases in which the relationship between the
public and private sectors is based solely on a written contract, for instance
the aforementioned case of concessions. In thismodel, the public partner does
6 The PPP legislation in Brazil establishes two types of concessions: sponsored concession, which
requires governmental subsidies, and administrative concession, for which the revenues generated
by the project are sufﬁcient (Pereira 2014).
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not interfere in day-to-day activities, and there is no mixed capital company.
In the second type, institutionalised PPPs, the public and the private sectors are
partners in a new, third entity or in an existing public company that sells a
percentage of its shares. Although necessary, mixed ownership is not sufﬁcient
to consider these companies institutionalised PPPs; among other requirements, a
limited duration, the existence of a shareholders’ agreement, and the transfer of
risk the private partner are also mandatory. In the institutionalised PPP model,
each partner has its own shares and managerial responsibilities, although most
management responsibilities are usually held by the private actor, while the
public partner performs an ‘internal regulation’ (da Cruz and Marques 2012b).
The boundaries of what is and is not a PPP are not always clear. In many
countries and institutions it is possible to ﬁnd contradictory classiﬁcations.
There seems to be a general consensus, however, that in order for an arrange-
ment to be classiﬁed as a PPP, the private sector needs to take on a signiﬁcant
level of risk. In fact, European Commission rules (see EPEC 2010) state that
‘most of the project risk’ must be transferred to the private sector for it to be
considered a PPP arrangement, and for example, the assets may be considered
off the public balance sheet.7 The problem is that there are no clear, quanti-
tative measures to assess the level of risk allocated to one or more private
partners. For example, in a transport project, for example a highway, the
demand risk is usually one of the most impactful, but in many transport
concessions this risk is greatly reduced, with the government providing rev-
enue guarantees to ensure a more predictable cash ﬂow.
Figure 6.1 presents an overview of several delivery models and deﬁnes what
can be classiﬁed as a PPP arrangement. The scheme represents two main
variables—level of control over service delivery and level of control over
assets—and for each variable assumes a variation between public control and
private control.
Contractual and institutionalised PPPs
A contractual PPP is typically structured around a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) with juridical and economic autonomy and created for the single pur-
pose of managing the project. The accountability implications of SPVs are
manifold, but their main feature is the ability to compartmentalise ﬁnancial
risk, curbing the liabilities of shareholders. An SPV is necessary given the
ﬁnancing structure of PPPs. Private ﬁnancing of projects can be done via
7 The European Commission has established three types of risk: construction risk, which is
related to the activities of building the infrastructure; availability risk, which is related to
maintaining the infrastructure with an adequate level of service; and demand risk, which is
related to the inﬂow of users of the system (EPEC 2010).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 23/9/2016, SPi
Public–Private Partnership
111
Comp. by: C. Vijayakumar Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002855194 Date:23/9/16
Time:14:22:56 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002855194.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 112
corporate ﬁnance or project ﬁnance. The former constitutes a case in which
debt is provided upon validation of the credit rating of a company. The latter
provides debt based on a project’s cash ﬂow, in this case the SPV. As men-
tioned above, while in corporate ﬁnance the assets of a company are the
guarantee against a contracted debt, in project ﬁnance cash ﬂow is the main
guarantee for a lender. Although not exclusive to PPP projects, this ﬁnancing
structure is a key reason for the proliferation of PPP arrangements over recent
years, given its ability to raise credit without leveraging the existing assets of
the contracting parties and thus reducing their liabilities signiﬁcantly.
Figure 6.2 presents the typical contractual structure of a concession.
The creation of a purely instrumental SPV is not applicable to the case of
institutionalised PPP arrangements. In fact, the creation of a mixed, public–
private company is the main purpose of an institutionalised PPP. Unlike
contractual PPPs, where the relationship between the partners is established
through a rigid written contract and the private partner is solely responsible
for delivering the services, with institutionalised PPPs the public and private
partners join together in a single company to jointly manage and deliver the
services. This complex arrangement is illustrated in Figure 6.3.8
In terms of the ﬁnancing scheme, there are no major differences between
contractual or institutionalised PPPs. The differences are mostly in terms of
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(public company, 
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Affermage or lease 
contract*  
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(BOT, DBFO, others)
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Privatisation or divestiture
* PPP arrangements 
Figure 6.1. Examples of PPP arrangements
Source: Adapted from Delmon (2010)
8 Although mixed companies are usually directly responsible for operation and maintenance,
particularly in local PPP arrangements, the delegation of these tasks to another entity is also
possible.
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governance. In theory, themixed companymodel would allow the devising of a
relational agreement capable of coping with unforeseen or unexpected events
without the need for costly renegotiations. Moreover, the idea is that the public
partner carries out internal regulation with much better access to information.
However, evidence shows that the fragilities of the model constrain the theor-
etical positive outcomes and often result in the poor protection of the public
interest (for details on these arrangements, see da Cruz and Marques 2012b).
Occasionally, public authorities engage with private actors in initiatives that
are not framed in the two models described above and outlined in Figures 6.2
and 6.3. This third type of PPPs may be referred to as collaborative PPPs. These
initiatives correspond to either 1) development projects fromwhich both public
and private partners can extract beneﬁts, in other words since the objectives of
all parties are naturally aligned, there is no need for formal contractual incen-
tives; or 2) projects championed and ﬁnanced by the public authority, with
input from both for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt players actively sought, in other
Public 
authority
Concession 
contract 
(PPP 
contract)
Contractor Operator
Construction
contract
Operation &
maintenance
contract
Financial 
institutions
Financing 
contract, 
guarantee 
contract
Shareholders
agreement
Social 
contractSPV
Subscribers
agreement
Private 
partners 
(shareholders)
Figure 6.2. Typical contractual structure of a concession, the most common model of
contractual PPP
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words the opinions of these players are regarded as important for the success of
those publicly led initiatives. Common examples include land development
and urban regeneration projects. Instead of contracts, these collaborations are
often framed by protocols. Among other technicalities, the absence of sunk
investments on non-tradable assets and of transfer of risks to private actors are
key aspects that do not conform to the PPP concept as it is deﬁned above.
Economic rationale
Even though the topic of PPPs warrants discussions around wider political
economy, agency, and behavioural and institutional issues, in order to
Private 
partner
Statutes
Public 
authority
Mixed
company
Management 
contract
Shareholders
agreement
(PPP 
contract)
Some % of the shares
(usually a majority stake)
Some % of the shares
(usually a minority stake)
Contractor Operator
Construction
contract
Financial 
institutions
Financing 
contract, 
guarantee 
contract
Operation & 
maintenance
contract
Figure 6.3. Typical contractual structure of an institutionalised PPP
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understand the concept of PPP it is fundamental to grasp the economic
motivations behind the model. Project ﬁnance leveraged in debt and equity
from the private sector is more expensive than traditional public ﬁnancing.
Private debt or equity requires a higher return than risk-free debt, for example
public debt or bonds, given the need to charge a risk premium.
So, if ﬁnancing through PPPs is substantially more expensive, why even
consider adopting the model? The answer to this question lies within the
economics of PPPs. The economics of PPPs are built upon a generalised
assumption of achieving cheaper infrastructure, quicker delivery, and/or bet-
ter quality of service—or in reality, an efﬁcient trade-off between these often
conﬂicting objectives—due to three main intrinsic characteristics: adopting a
whole life cycle approach, better control over time and cost, and more efﬁ-
cient private management.
Technically, the integration of several stages of an infrastructure project,
such as design, construction, and maintenance, should allow for achieving
lower life cycle costs. The rationale behind this is fairly simple. Traditional
public work contracts are focused on decreasing the cost of construction,
which may not minimise total life cycle costs. For example, an increase in
cost during construction due to using costlier but also more durable mater-
ials may result in even higher savings during the maintenance phase. The
bundling of stages provides an incentive to rationalise costs, thus decreasing
the overall cost of infrastructure provision during the entire life cycle. The
focus of the project managers is no longer to minimise the CAPEX9 but
rather to minimise the TOTEX.10 In a typical PPP scheme, for example a
BOT concession, in addition to optimisation of the TOTEX, there is assur-
ance for the contracting entity that, given a proper competitive environ-
ment, the potential private partners will cover all available technology and
best practices in their bids, thus increasing the probability of ﬁnding an
optimal solution.
Construction cost and time overruns have long been critical issues for
engineering and technical designers as well as planners in the public sector,
and there is unquestionably a general tendency towards skewed frequency
distributions, in that overruns are extremely common and often very lengthy
and costly, whereas timely and on-budget completions are very rare. There are
several reasons to explain the bias towards cost overruns in public infrastruc-
ture projects, most of them related to the complexity of projects such as
airports, dams, bridges, and ports and also due to the dynamic economic
9 CAPEX is the capital expenditure, that is the cost of acquiring, building, and/or improving a
long-term physical asset.
10 TOTEX is the sum of all capital expenditure: the asset, a subsystem, or a component,
including the acquisition cost, the operating costs, and the residual value if negative, for
example dismantling or disposal.
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and political contexts in which these projects are planned and designed
(Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, and Buhl 2003; Anziger and Kostka and Sovacool,
et al. in this volume).
Finally, the perhaps less technical feature is also the most contentious.
Indeed, one of the main normative beliefs behind the PPP alternative is that
the private sector is more efﬁcient, in other words capable of producing more
outputs with fewer inputs, than the public sector in delivering infrastructure
services. The rationale for this argument of higher private sector efﬁciency is
associated with the competition to access the market. Demsetz (1968) deﬁned
the processes of competition for the market and competition in the market.
Most infrastructure PPPs are focused essentially on competition for the mar-
ket, given that the object of a PPP is usually a natural monopoly and therefore
immune to ex-post competition. The effect of this ex-ante competition, how-
ever, can only be achieved and retained through a regulatory model that
removes barriers to entry, enforces efﬁciency, and fosters the incumbent to
continuously improve its performance, hence avoiding a rent-seeking attitude
where contract drafting and management are key. The not exclusive but
certainly important function of the regulator is to replace the competition in
the market.
Optimal risk allocation and value for money maximisation
Another indispensable aspect in any discussion of PPPs is risk analysis and risk
sharing. In this case, risk should be regarded as any present or future action or
event capable of inﬂuencing a project’s forecasted variables, especially costs or
revenues, either negatively, in terms of downside risks, or positively, in terms
of upside risks. Risk analysis for a PPP arrangement is generally structured
around a risk matrix, which should contain at least two key elements: an
exhaustive identiﬁcation of the risks involved and a clear allocation of those
risks, that is whether a given risk is a public, private, or shared responsibility.
A third element is also desirable: a quantitative or qualitative evaluation of
risks that predicts the likelihood and project impacts of each risk and suggests
actions to prevent or mitigate the risks.
The allocation of risk is not a straightforward task. Principal-agent theory
indicates that each risk should be allocated to the agent best suited to control
or inﬂuence it (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Furthermore, the more risk
assumed by a private partner, the higher the risk premium. This means that
the private sector is able to assume some level of risk but will demand remu-
neration in exchange for coping with it. Transferring all risks to the private
sector might therefore not be the best solution, since there are risks, for
instance legal risks, that the private sector is not properly equipped tomanage.
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Forcing the private sector to accept all risks may result in an extremely high
risk premium, jeopardising the potential value for money of a PPP.11
In sum, it is essential to ensure an effective risk allocation that avoids a
moral hazard problem, which occurs when a private partner assumes risks on
paper but, because of contractual clauses detailing exceptions that shift risk
back to the public sector, does not actually have to take on the costs of such
risks in the event that they materialise during a project. Information asym-
metry is once again at the root of economic theory’s explanation for themoral
hazard problem (Arrow 1971). Private partners are often large multinational
ﬁrms or operators with many years of experience and projects in several
jurisdictions. Because they are involved in the daily management and delivery
of projects, they hold privileged information about business and operational
activities when compared to the public sector entities.
Facing reality
Understanding the concepts, approaches, and rationales behind PPPs, we
now turn to empirical evidence regarding their performance and outcomes in
infrastructure in order to determine whether expectations tend to meet reality.
Cost of ﬁnancing
As discussed in the previous section, a higher cost of capital for private
ﬁnancing is an expected feature of PPPs. However, empirical evidence suggests
that the expected savings from other theoretical features of PPPs consistently
fail to outweigh these higher ﬁnancing costs.
Shaoul, Stafford, and Stapleton (2006) analysed eight concession contracts
in the road sector in the UK and found an after-tax return on capital of
29 per cent and a cost of capital of 11 per cent, versus a cost of capital of
4.5 per cent for public ﬁnance—what the authors claim to be ‘highway
robbery’. In a similar study, Acerete et al. (2010) examined Spanish road
concessions and found that after nine years, accumulated costs had surpassed
original construction costs: the actual cost of the concessions was higher than
the initial forecasted investment for construction and maintenance. A similar
conclusion was reached by Fernandes, Ferreira, and Moura (2016), who ana-
lysed seven Portuguese shadow toll road concessions. In this case, the authors
estimated that the interest paid to lenders and shareholders represented
around 28 per cent of the total shadow tolls paid by the government, a
11 Value for money can be understood as a measure of utility in public spending. Value for
money tests are based on the estimation of the expected life cycle costs of a public delivery model.
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value similar to the entire construction cost—31 per cent of the total shadow
tolls—and more than double the operating cost, at 15 per cent. The overall
conclusion is that the cost of ﬁnancing PPPs is excessively high, consuming
vast resources from citizens/users and governments.
Efﬁciency and on-budget and on-time performance
There are several empirical examples of the superiority of private over public
management of infrastructure services. For example, in the water sector,
private management has been associated with more effective reductions in
water losses (Andrés et al. 2008) of both technical, such as pipe leaks, and
commercial, such as illegal connections, natures (Gassner, Popov, and Pushak
2009). It should be noted, however, that gains in efﬁciency are often associated
with employee layoffs: in Latin America, 20 to 65 per cent of employees were
laid off after privatisation (Marin 2012). Even in the transport sector, there is
evidence of highly intense labour use by private companies, sometimes leading
to a 42 per cent lower average cost per vehicle-kilometre, as reported in an
analysis of the Spanish transport market (De Rus and Nombela 1997).
Already some time ago, empirical evidence suggested that PPP schemes
could provide better cost and time performance during construction
(Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, and Buhl 2003, 2004; Grimsey and Lewis 2002).
More recently, some authors have focused their research on comparing per-
formance regarding construction costs (Raisbeck, Dufﬁeld, and Xu 2010),
while others have focused on time performance (Hampton, Baldwin, and
Holt 2012), but the conclusions are consistent. It is important to note that
for the public sector, in terms of ﬁnancial burden, a PPP is similar to a price cap
construction contract for the TOTEX, all else being equal. The problem arises
when the context, particularly regarding policies, changes, leading to inevit-
able and very expensive renegotiations. In fact, PPP contracts often contain
triggers that deploy renegotiation if certain expectations do not materialise or
if certain variables ﬂuctuate beyond a speciﬁc threshold. The renegotiation
process occurs without competitive pressure from other bidders, which makes
prices detach from true costs, and often in an environment of signiﬁcant
asymmetric information in which the private incumbent is equipped with
more and better information than the public partner.
Contract incompleteness and renegotiations
Renegotiations take place when an existing contract is no longer suitable to
regulate the relationship between partners and does not truly conform to
reality. In some way, renegotiations can be a measure of success in the sense
that the need to resort to renegotiation indicates a contract failure. Such
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contract failure and the need for renegotiations are the result of the unavoid-
able incompleteness of long-term agreements. Concerning the incomplete
nature of contracts, Tirole (1986) claimed that the impossibility of foreseeing
all possible contingencies and circumstances should make agents aware of the
potential for future renegotiations. Even earlier, Williamson (1976) asserted
that the franchising of natural monopolies may suffer from what were then
designated ‘contractual disabilities’. The merit of contractual regulation, as in
the case of PPPs, over ‘institutional regulation’ undertaken by external regu-
lators is to avoid the discretionary behaviour of regulators (Gómez-Ibáñez
2003). But the empirical evidence around renegotiations and particularly
their negative outcomes for the public interest has raised several critiques
and concerns about the real-world use of the PPP model. The incomplete
nature of contracts assumes a particular relevance in PPPs given their duration,
the investment outlays involved, and the essential nature of the services in
question. Over the course of thirty or forty years, social, political, and eco-
nomic backgrounds will very likely change signiﬁcantly, which in turn makes
contracts more vulnerable to incompleteness.
In theory, renegotiations per se are not necessarily negative for the public
interest. Given the long-term nature of a PPP relationship and the bounded
rationality that affects the drafting of the original contract, when partners face
new circumstances or events during the execution of a contract, it might be
beneﬁcial for both agents to discuss and rearrange the terms of the partnership
in order to accommodate those changes. Potentially, this could allow the
partners to mutually mitigate unwelcome effects, that is downside risk, or
reap the beneﬁts of new opportunities, that is upside risk (da Cruz and
Marques 2012a). The unavoidable but controlled losses or the seized and
originally unexpected gains could then be shared by the partners, depending
on the risk matrix agreed upon beforehand.
The problem is that reality usually turns out quite differently. There is
burgeoning empirical evidence of a systematic bias towards harmful disadvan-
tages for the public sector (Cruz and Marques 2014; Guasch 2004; Sarmento
and Renneboog 2014). Guasch (2004) found that over 50 per cent of PPP
contract renegotiations in Latin America had one of more of the following
outcomes: delays in investment, tariff increases, increase in costs with auto-
matic pass-through to tariff increases, and reduction of investment obligations.
In all of these cases, the results of the renegotiation had a major negative
impact for the public interest.
There are several reasons for this. First, most renegotiations occur in
response to unilateral decisions that have been undertaken by the public
partner and that negatively impact the PPP agreement by changing, for
instance, the scope of the concession, the investment plan, or the legal and
regulatory framework. Given these new changes and requirements deployed
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by the governmental authority, a private partner then requests renegotiation
of a contract. Second, renegotiations occur in a non-competitive and
unbalanced environment where a private partner holds more and better
information. Even with the strong involvement of the public authority in
monitoring and controlling a project, a private partner will always retainmore
know-how and data regarding the project or service because it is in charge
of delivery.12 And in fact, public authorities are usually not that committed
to effective contract monitoring and management. This third factor—poor
managerial capacity of the public sector—is the result of two drivers. First, the
public authority generally employs signiﬁcant resources in a PPP process
until contract signature, after which there is a typical alienation towards the
project, in that there is a sense of delegation of responsibilities.13 Second,
growing budgetary constraints and the outsourcing of governmental functions
decrease the public sector’s capacity.
Given the generally negative public interest outcome of renegotiations, the
problem becomes a massive one considering the frequency with which rene-
gotiations tend to occur. A good example of this situation is Portugal, which
has been very enthusiastic in developing PPPs in a range of sectors since the
early 1990s and which today is burdened with active PPPs accounting for over
1 per cent of GDP annually and €25 billion in gross payment responsibilities
until 2050 (only central government PPPs) (Cruz and Marques 2013). As
shown in Figure 6.4, which presents an overview of 112 renegotiation pro-
cesses that occurred between 1995 and 2012 in Portugal in several sectors, the
percentage of contracts renegotiated is very high—100 per cent for roads,
railways, and water systems. Moreover, ﬁrst renegotiations tend to happen
extremely early on in the contracts: most concession contracts have durations
of twenty, thirty or forty years, and the majority of renegotiations took place
within the ﬁrst ﬁve years. Finally, another alarming result is that the same
contract is frequently renegotiated. Indeed, the consequences and likelihood
of renegotiation represent a major weakness of the PPP framework.
12 In institutionalised PPPs, the information asymmetry problem may not be so accentuated
because the public partner is also involved in day-to-day management. However, this creates a
situation in which the public authority acts as an operator and a regulator simultaneously, which at
times may generate conﬂicts of interest. Indeed, as discussed in da Cruz and Marques (2012b) the
problems with mixed companies are slightly different from the problems with the more common
purely contractual PPPs.
13 Nevertheless, the ultimate responsibility for making essential public infrastructure services
available to the population will always lie with the public authorities. Irrespective of the producer,
which may be private, the provider is the competent public authority. From a citizen’s perspective,
the ownership or governance model of the producer is not relevant. That is, the public authority
actually delegates tasks, not responsibilities.
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The road ahead for PPPs
The global experience with PPP arrangements has been largely trial-and-error,
with expensive lessons for governments, citizens/users, and much more
rarely, private partners. The underlying economic principle of PPPs is achiev-
ing higher value for money, in other words better services at lower costs. But
the complexity and liabilities inherent to the model have often eroded any
advantages of bringing competitive market pressure to public infrastructure
sectors. The PPP model has, simultaneously, ﬁerce advocates and ﬁerce critics,
but the latter group have not been able to provide feasible alternatives to ﬁnance
public infrastructure without private involvement, or realistic alternatives to use
private ﬁnancing in entirely different arrangements. The trend therefore has
been to incrementally build upon and improve existing PPP models.
It is unlikely that the recourse to private ﬁnancing will decrease any time in
the near future. While infrastructure assets continue to deteriorate and main-
tenance deﬁcits persist in developed economies, there is a growing search for
maximising efﬁciency and productivity in public services and infrastructure.
Often the neoliberal assumption that private management is better suited to
accomplish these objectives still prevails. Furthermore, a crucial driver for the
growth of PPPs has been the fact that the main ﬁnanciers promote the use of
this procurementmodel. Development banks, multilateral agencies, sovereign
funds, and bilateral governmental ﬁnancing agreements have all promoted
the use of PPPs for infrastructure development, and in most cases, ﬁnancing
is even conditional on heavy private sector involvement in the project.
Development banks are actively supporting building government capacity to
create a fertile basis for private sector growth and participation in public
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Figure 6.4. Renegotiations in 112 Portuguese PPPs between 1995 and 2012
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infrastructure delivery. This occurs not only in emerging countries but also in
advanced economies. The bailouts of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are recent
examples of ﬁnancial aid conditioned to a reform programme with an overall
strategy of opening infrastructure services to a greater private sector participa-
tion in the form of PPPs or full privatisations.
Nevertheless, the use of the PPP model is at a crossroads. The documented
failures of the past use of PPPs—particularly concerning renegotiations, their
harmful results, and the excessive capital costs—have led policy-makers to
seek out new models for partnering. An example currently gaining momen-
tum is the non-proﬁt distribution (NPD) scheme, developed in Scotland and
worth £3.5 billion. Deriving from the well-known private ﬁnance initiative
(PFI) model, the NPD scheme represented an innovative relationship model
between the public and the private sectors (Hellowell and Pollock 2009). The
main innovation of the NPD model is that it caps the level of returns and
reinvests in non-proﬁt activities any surplus that might arise from the devel-
opment of a project. The search for these more collaborative models aims at
coping with the idea that during contract execution, private partners can
engage in opportunistic rent-seeking strategies and obtain large economic
surpluses. This model also tries to prevent strategic behaviour, for example
lowball bidding, in expectation of post-award gains after renegotiation. But
other, more conservative alternatives are being considered to decrease capital
costs, for example debt funding competition. Under this model, it is possible
to achieve a lower capital cost. After the contract is signed, the private and
public sector jointly search for the most favourable ﬁnancing source(s).
The proﬁle of projects is also changing. The literature suggests that
projects are evolving towards high-value transactions, in some cases bundling
smaller-scale dispersed projects into a single large transaction, similar to the
Pennsylvania Rapid Bridge Replacement Project in the USA or the Secondary
School Building Modernisation Programme in Portugal (da Cruz and Marques
2012a). Governments are becoming more and more creative in extracting
potential beneﬁts from private sector expertise. For instance, in order to
improve the selection mechanism of projects, countries such as Brazil are
promotingmarket-led, unsolicited proposals. This model places on the private
sector the responsibility or the initiative for analysing and selecting those
projects with higher returns. However, although allowing for a ﬁrst screening
of ﬁnancially viable projects, this model does not ensure a comprehensive
analysis of infrastructure needs or the maximisation of social welfare.
In conclusion, the market for PPP development is growing, and so is the
appetite of private ﬁnanciers and governments. In 2014, the G20 launched
the G20 Global Infrastructure Initiative, a multi-year programme to support
public and private investment in quality infrastructure, acknowledging the
need for structuring knowledge and know-how and helping governments to
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successfully deliver needed infrastructure while engaging private ﬁnancing.
Success in the design and implementation of PPP projects depends on a
myriad of factors, but one arises as most relevant for the years to come:
building up trust between the public and private sectors. The pitfalls in the
use of PPPs—particularly the costly renegotiations, rent-seeking strategies by
private sector bidders, and unilateral changes by governments—have all con-
verged to an environment where a lack of trust inevitably leads to higher risk
premiums,more expensive projects, and ultimately inability to deliver projects
successfully.
Building trust is required at different levels. At a strategic level, political
commitment assumes a fundamental role in the good governance of infra-
structure projects. Infrastructure projects are often used by the opposition as a
political battleground against incumbent governments, transforming the
process of infrastructure delivery into a long-lasting stop-and-go motion.
At a tactical level, trust should be built by setting up proper institutional
bodies in order to assure the steady and reputable governance of infrastruc-
ture delivery programmes that particularly aim at attracting relevant private
sector interest and participation. At the operational level, trust is promoted
through transparent, clear, and competitive tenders; well-informed deci-
sions based on cost–beneﬁt analysis, value for money tests, and robust
forecasts, among other tools; and also in a ﬂexible contract design able to
cope with rapidly changing environments or requirements. It is unrealistic
to expect that such long-term contracts can be complete. The contractual
framework can, however, be equipped to deal with this inherent incom-
pleteness, providing the proper mechanisms to regulate and manage con-
tractual changes. The existence of a mature economic, political, and
regulatory environment is a requisite for engaging the private sector in
infrastructure delivery and infrastructure governance at a fair cost while
providing value for money.
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